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THE EVIDENCE OF ANONYMOUS WITNESSES IN 
CRIMINAL COURTS: 






Anonymous witness evidence, the use of which had quietly expanded in the 
early part of the twenty-first century in criminal courts in England and Wales, 
was significantly curtailed by the House of Lords in the case of R v Davis.1 
Little over a month later the government had enacted legislation to minimise 
the impact of their Lordships’ ruling, yet the long-term future of this area of 
the criminal law of evidence remains undetermined. 
This article seeks to assess what impact the Criminal Evidence 
(Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 has had on the right to a fair trial in England 
and Wales and, subsequently, to weigh up the options for long-term reform in 
this area of the law. It will be submitted that the stated policy aim of the 
government, the protection of witnesses, can be achieved for the long-term 





Lord Bingham has dated the debate surrounding anonymous accusation 
back to Ancient Rome, the Inquisition and Star Chamber in Tudor England.2 
In the 1970s a Commission under Lord Diplock reached the same conclusion: 
that concealing witnesses’ identities, and thus removing the right of the 
accused to confront his accusers, was not appropriate to combat even the then-
severe danger of paramilitary intimidation.3  
Yet for all this long history, thirty-three days in the summer of 2008 will 
be remembered as being pivotal in the history of the rights of the accused and, 
more fundamentally, the right a fair trial in England and Wales. This article is 
∗ Student member of the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn.  
1 R v Davis [2008] 1 AC 1128. 
2 Ibid, at para [5].  
3 “Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist 
activities in Northern Ireland” HMSO, 1972, Cmnd. 5185.  
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not exclusively concerned with rehearsing the details of this short period but 
instead seeks to look ahead and assess what is next for the rights of defendants 
in our criminal justice system, which previously stood strong through the 
difficulties of previous generations.  
On June 18th 2008 the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords gave 
judgment in the case of R v Davis. The appellant Iain Davis had been 
convicted of a double murder at an all-night party on New Years Eve 2002. At 
trial Davis was convicted following testimony of three witnesses who alone 
were able to identify him as the gunman. Owing to their fear of reprisals 
following any testimony these critical prosecution witnesses were granted a 
host of special measures to conceal their identity from the defendant and his 
legal team.  
The three witnesses were concealed from sight of the defendant by 
screens and had their voices electronically distorted. Their names and other 
potentially identifying details were concealed and the defendant’s legal 
representatives were not able to ask the witnesses any questions which might 
have led to the revelation of their identities. The witnesses against Davis were 
anonymous and their testimony decisive. Those who gave the decisive 
testimony against him, Davis alleged, did so with the desire to see him 
convicted, yet defence counsel were not able to explore this allegation.4 As a 
result of the protection afforded to his accusers Davis was not able to conduct 
his defence fully and at trial he was convicted of double murder. An appeal 
against conviction was lodged. 
Though the name of Davis is and will remain most closely associated with 
the debate surrounding anonymity of witnesses, his appeal to the Court of 
Appeal, and ultimately to the House of Lords, was heard alongside a similar 
case of arguably greater notoriety. In March 2005 the murder convictions of 
Marcus Ellis and others for shooting dead Leticia Shakespeare and Charlene 
Ellis in a gang-related murder in Birmingham were handed down following a 
trial in which the evidence of one anonymous witness for the Crown, “Mark 
Brown,” proved contentious but ultimately decisive. “Mark Brown” had his 
name and true identity withheld from the defence and jury, gave evidence 
behind a screen and had his true voice distorted and played to the court on a 
time delay. Brown was known to be a convicted criminal and self-confessed 
rival gang member. Yet he remained otherwise wholly anonymous. As Nigel 
Rumfitt QC stated in his closing speech for the defence, “As far as we are 
aware, no witness has ever been allowed to give evidence in the way Brown 
was in the entire history of our common law going back the best part of 1,000 
4 Iain Davis alleged that his anonymous accusers included his ex-girlfriend and her 
new boyfriend. Any defence cross-examination as to the anonymous witnesses’ 
motives, or which would lead to their identity being revealed, were strictly proscribed 
at trial.  
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years.”5 Media reaction to this verdict recognised that the fundamental 
reliance placed by the Crown on anonymous testimony had marked a “legal 
precedent.”6
On appeal to the Court of Appeal in 2006 the special measures granted at 
the trials of Davis and Ellis were deemed to have had basis at common law 
and were adjudged to have been applied in a manner consistent with the right 
to a fair trial, guaranteed by Art 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.7  Subsequently the trials of Iain Davis and Marcus Ellis were deemed 
to have been fair and their respective convictions for murder were upheld. 
Leave to appeal was initially refused by the Court of Appeal, before being 
granted by their Lordships in the House of Lords on October 10th 2006.  
On June 18th 2008 the House of Lords reached the opposite conclusion to 
that of the Court of Appeal and in allowing the appeal of Davis and others, 
handed down a judgment that was to capture attention in government and 
Parliament and bring the law of criminal evidence to the front pages of the 
tabloid press. The House of Lords unanimously ruled in R v Davis8 that a 
conviction, based solely or to a decisive extent on the testimony of 
anonymous witnesses, was unsafe, and that such a means of conviction was 
incompatible with Art 6 (3) (d) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.9
 
R V DAVIS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 
 
Lord Mance, in his speech in Davis, examined in some detail the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on matters of and 
relating to the human rights compatibility of State reliance on anonymous 
testimony in criminal proceedings with the defendant’s absolute right to a fair 
trial. Of particular importance was the case of Doorson v The Netherlands, a 
case which Lord Mance read and applied in a manner distinct to that of the 
Court of Appeal previously.10 In the Court of Appeal it was held that the 
“essential question” in Doorson had been “whether the proceedings were 
unfair.” Lord Judge, in the Court of Appeal, stated: “Notwithstanding the 
5 “Murder Trial Sets Legal Precedent” BBC News Online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/west_midlands/4357759.stm. 
6 Ibid.  
7 R v Davis [2006] 4 All ER 648. 
8 R v Davis [2008] 1 AC 1128 . 
9 Article 6(3)(D) “The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms”: The accused has the minimum right “to examine or have 
examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.”. 
10 Doorson v The Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330. 
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significance to the conviction of the evidence of two anonymous witnesses, in 
Doorson the conclusion was that [proceedings] were not [unfair].”11
The Court of Appeal interpreted the case of Doorson as authority for the 
proposition that the “essential question” for the Strasbourg Court in 
determining whether the right to a fair trial was violated was whether 
proceedings were rendered “unfair.” Doorson was also treated by the Court of 
Appeal as a precedent, showing the Strasbourg Court unwilling to deem a trial 
where anonymous testimony was used to secure conviction as unfair or 
amounting to a breach of the accused’s Art 6 right.  
Lord Mance in the House of Lords, however, appears to have read the 
case of Doorson differently. Firstly, the matter of whether “proceedings as a 
whole…were fair” is described in Lord Mance’s speech not as “the essential 
question” but instead as merely “a starting point.”12 Secondly, Lord Mance 
attaches little weight to the outcome of the case of Doorson, treating it not as 
an example of the European Court of Human Rights finding anonymous 
evidence as being generally acceptable, but as “a conclusion difficult to 
follow on the facts.”13 Thirdly, Lord Mance highlights the proposition of 
European Human Rights law, found in Doorson, which was to determine the 
appeal of Davis ultimately successful. His Lordship quotes the judgment of 
the Strasbourg court as follows: 
 
“Finally, it should be recalled that, even where ‘counterbalancing’ 
procedures are found to compensate sufficiently for the handicaps 
under which the defence labours, a conviction should not be based 
either solely or to a decisive extent on anonymous statements.”14
 
Although the jurisprudence of the European Court does not proscribe the 
use of anonymous testimony entirely, emphasis is placed on the provision of 
“counterbalancing measures” to ensure a degree of fairness, compatible with 
the absolute Art 6 right. Such measures were, it seems, absent in the case of 
Davis. More particularly, Lord Mance highlights the “sole and decisive 
evidence” principle as the appropriate test which the Strasbourg Court applies 
in cases concerning anonymous witness testimony in order to determine 
whether such trials are fair, within the meaning of Art6. Accordingly, if 
anonymous evidence, which handicapped the defendant’s Art 6(3)(d) right to 
examine his accusers, was the “sole and decisive” reason for conviction then 
the European Court of Human Rights would most likely deduced, find a 
violation of the Convention. Lord Mance concluded that the Strasbourg Court 
11 Above n 7, Sir Igor Judge P at para [38].  
12 Above n 8, Lord Mance at para [75].   
13 Ibid, at  para [77].  
14 Ibid, at para [80]. Lord Mance citing Doorson v The Netherlands at para [76].  
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would not have found the trial of Davis to have been fair; the murder 
conviction had been based to a decisive extent on the evidence of Davis’s 
anonymous accusers, evidence which could not be properly tested by the 
defendant or counterbalanced by other measures.  
 
R V DAVIS: THE COMMON LAW DIMENSION 
 
The House of Lords decision in R v Davis was unanimous on the matter of 
breach of the appellant’s Art 6 rights, but closer analysis of their Lordships’ 
individual speeches reveals a multiplicity of views on the status of witness 
anonymity at common law. Whereas the Court of Appeal decisively stated 
that there existed “clear jurisdiction at common law to admit incriminating 
evidence given against the defendant by anonymous witnesses” their 
Lordships did not attempt to formulate any such conclusion on the common 
law position.15 There appears to be a general acceptance by their Lordships of 
the existence of a common law power to grant witnesses anonymity, but with 
the qualification that any such power is limited to operation within the 
parameters established in R v Murphy (which are discussed in detail below).16 
Only Lord Roger of Earlsferry approaches a position of denial of any common 
law power to grant witness anonymity, stating, “the appellant’s trial did not 
meet that standards required by Art 6 of the European Convention. In the 
circumstances it is unnecessary to decide whether the decision in R v Murphy 
is consistent with the common law.”17  
As Lord Mance concluded, in light of the incompatibility of the degree of 
anonymity granted to Crown witnesses at the trial of Davis with Art 6, any 
common law power for Courts to grant such anonymity had been manifestly 
exceeded. Their Lordships declined to extend an uncertain common law 
power to the point where the defendant’s right to test the evidence against him 
was prejudiced, and extended an invitation to Parliament to clarify the law 
through statute. Parliament ultimately was to accept their Lordship’s 
invitation to abolish the common law rules regarding anonymity and replace 
them with a statutory scheme, in the Law Reform (Witness Anonymity) Act 
2008.18  
 
15 D Howarth “The Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008” Archbold 
News (2008) pp 6-9.  
16 R v Murphy [1990] NI 306, CA NI.  
17 Above note 1, at para [44].  
18 S 1(2) of the 2008 Act states “the common law rules relating to the power of a court 
to make an order for securing the identity of a witness in criminal proceedings is 
withheld from the defendant are abolished.” 
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The effects of their Lordships’ judgment in Davis were quickly and 
widely felt. On June 24th 2008 His Honour Judge Paget at the Central 
Criminal Court suspended a high-profile murder trial, involving anonymous 
testimony by prosecution witnesses, near to the close of the Crown’s case. 
Further such trial collapses were feared and the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords was roundly blamed. “Chaos as the Law Lords Ruin Trials” 
was the verdict of one mass circulation tabloid newspaper.19
With the press stirring fears that “terrorists, murderers and violent 
criminals will escape justice”20 the Government pledged emergency 
legislation, and by July 21st 2008, only thirty-three days after the decision in R 
v Davis the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 was on the 
statute books and in force. This Act was only enacted as a short-term measure. 
Those who argued for a “Sunset Clause” as the Bill passed through Parliament 
were successful and the long-term future of anonymous testimony in criminal 
courts in England and Wales remains uncertain. 21 This article seeks to look 
into the future and assess the extent to which the evidence of anonymous 
witnesses is desirable in the courts of England and Wales and how such 
evidence may be fairly balanced with the fundamental right of the accused to 
test the evidence against him. 
It will be argued that witness anonymity orders, as per the 2008 Act, must 
be a measure of last resort in the criminal courts, and even when used must be 
subject to rigorous independent scrutiny. Whereas the witness who has 
absolutely no prior knowledge of the defendant, his associates or the context 
of the alleged offence may, exceptionally, prove suitable for anonymity those 
with a propensity or motive to lie, or a grudge to settle, such as “Michael 
Brown”, must be denied any such measures as would handicap the conduct of 
the defence. This approach, it will be argued, will enable our system of 
criminal justice not just to pursue an approach “consistent with” the rights of 
the accused, but to place such rights at the forefront of our endeavours to 
achieve justice openly and fairly, through the evidence-based conviction of 
the guilty.  
 
“CREEPING EMASCULATION”: THE ROAD TO R V DAVIS 
 
As was noted above, the use of anonymous witnesses was deemed a step 
too far in the 1970s, even in the face of paramilitary violence in Northern 
Ireland. It is therefore worth briefly noting how the use of such testimony to 
secure conviction in the criminal courts of England and Wales reached the 
19 “Chaos as the Law Lords Ruin Trials” The Sun (June 25th 2008). 
20 “Murders will escape justice without new laws to end ‘secret witness’ ban, warns 
Straw” The Daily Mail  (June 25th 2008).    
21 “Sunset Clause” s 14 Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity Act) 2008.  
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point by summer 2008 when their Lordships were forced to declare “the 
creeping emasculation of the common law principle must not only be halted 
but reversed.”22
The right of the accused to come face to face with his accuser was 
arguably first amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 32 of which 
permitted the giving of evidence via video link.23 More recently sections 16-
35 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 saw the introduction 
of various “special measures” to further keep vulnerable witnesses from 
having to face a defendant.24 However, these modifications to the strict right 
of confrontation do not allow for the concealment of identities. The ethos of 
these changes was the protection of the vulnerable victim. The measures 
inflict minimal, if any, prejudice on the defendant. They can not properly be 
deemed part of the “creeping emasculation” of the common law right of 
confrontation which their Lordships in Davis highlighted.  
It was through case law that the “creeping emasculation” truly began, and 
it is through case law that the defendant’s common law right to confrontation 
can be seen to have been gradually eroded.25 The 1990 case of R v Murphy 
saw anonymity being granted to television cameramen who had photographed 
a murder.26 Their evidence did not implicate the defendant and their 
credibility as witnesses was not in issue. The degree of anonymity granted at 
trial was slight; the photographers gave testimony behind a screen. They 
testified merely to confirm that they took the relevant photographs. As was 
discussed above, their Lordships in the House of Lords declined to firmly 
conclude whether the case of Murphy was rightly decided, and by extension, 
whether a common law power to grant witnesses anonymity flowed from this 
case. What can be concluded, however, is that Murphy may be taken to 
represents the clearest starting point for the admissibility of anonymous 
testimony in criminal trials, judicial understanding of which was to culminate 
in the vast array of special, identity-concealing measures granted to the 
pseudonym-witness “Michael Brown” in 2005, which proved such a severe 
handicap to the conduct of Marcus Ellis’s defence.  
22 Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood in Davis at para [66], the “common law 
principle” being the right of the defendant to face and challenge his accusers.  
23 S 55 Criminal Justice Act 1991 further advanced this innovation.  
24 Witnesses eligible for special measures as a result of being “in fear or distress”, as 
per s 17(1) Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act are not entitled to the “special 
measures” in ss 29 and 30 of the Act, reinforcing the proposition that such measures 
are aimed at improving the quality of testimony from a truly vulnerable victim.  
25 The outline of important cases here provided is for background purposes only. A 
more detailed examination of the authorities, and the gradual evolution of the 
common law stance on the right to confrontation, is provided by Lord Bingham in his 
speech in Davis.  
26 Discussed in greater detail in Davis at para [12].  
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Following the case of Murphy judicial acceptance of the ability to grant 
witness anonymity continued with the case of R v Taylor & Crab27 at the 
Central Criminal Court in 1994. At the murder trial of Taylor and Crab a 
witness to the alleged murder, known as “Miss A”, was granted anonymity as 
she gave her testimony. Crucially, however, the defendants saw “Miss A” on 
CCTV, in case she was known or recognisable to them.  
The 1993 case of R v Watford Magistrates Court ex parte Lenman28 was 
cited by the Court of Appeal in their consideration of the first appeal of Davis 
as evidence of a “clear jurisdiction at common law to admit incriminating 
evidence given against the defendant by anonymous witnesses.”29 The 
Watford case concerned a number of youths accused of violent disorder; 
witnesses were only willing to give evidence under pseudonyms, behind 
screens with their voices concealed, a set of special measures which 
Magistrates had acquiesced with for the purposes of committal proceedings. 
In upholding the special measures regime, the magistrates had approved 
Bedlam LJ went so far as to describe the power of courts to withhold 
witnesses’ identities as “well established.”30  
As late as 2003, the protection afforded to the accused, though the 
common law right of confrontation, was alive and well. In the judgment of 
Hughes J in R v Aston Bola anonymity for a witness in a drug-related murder 
case was refused.31  Lord Bingham in Davis highlighted this judgment as “a 
model of fairness”.32 The case of Aston Bola, however, represents something 
of a watershed. It was only in certain criminal trials after 2003 that the 
granting of anonymity by Crown Court judges to critical, incriminatory 
prosecution witnesses became problematic. Such trials included those of Iain 
Davis at the Central Criminal Court in May 2004 and that of Marcus Ellis in 
early 2005.  
From 1990, the year that saw the anonymous testimony of the 
photographers of a murder deemed acceptable, to 2005, when the heavily 
disguised “Michael Brown” took to the witness box, the “creeping 
emasculation” of the common law right of confrontation is clearly visible. The 
House of Lords was to find in 2008 that the expanding utilisation of 
anonymity for witnesses giving the “sole or decisive testimony” against a 
defendant represented an unacceptable violation of the common law right of 
27 R v Taylor & Crab, reported in The Times (17th August 1994) CA.  
28 R v Watford Magistrates Court ex p Lenman 1993 Crim LR 388, cited in R v Davis 
[2006] at para [27]. The case is considered by Lord Bingham in the House of Lords, 
at para [13] of Davis [2008].  
29 R v Watford Magistrates Court ex p Lenman [1993] Crim LR 388. 
30 Ibid. 
31 R v Bola (unreported) 18 June 2003. 
32 R v Davis [2008]. Lord Bingham at para [34].  
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the accused to confront his accusers, as well as being a measure incompatible 
with Art 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Their 
Lordships handed down their ruling in Davis on June 18th 2008. By July 21st, 
however, the Government had reacted.  
The critical questions this article will now turn to address are: firstly, 
whether the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 creates a 
satisfactory safeguard of the rights of the accused and his right to a fair trial 
and, secondly, what statutory measures may follow the 2008 Act to better 
safeguard and advance these fundamental human rights, upon which our 
system of criminal justice is based.  
 
THE “WITNESS ANONYMITY” ACT 2008: A SATISFACTORY 
SAFEGUARD OF THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED?  
 
The new Act was widely feared following the decision in Davis. 
Unfavourable comparisons were drawn early on with other legislation passed 
through Parliament on such a short timescale.33 “If government acts in haste, 
it may well repent at leisure” was typical of the concern voiced by 
commentators on all sides. 34
In the furore that followed their Lordships’ decision in Davis the 
government’s wish for swift legislation was clear. The first set of explanatory 
notes to the Witness Anonymity Bill, issued on July 3rd 2008, stated that the 
intended purpose of the Bill was to “restore the law to, broadly, the position it 
was believed to be prior to Davis.”35 The Government, it seems, was content 
with the so-called “creeping emasculation” of the defendant’s right of 
confrontation; convictions in high-profile shooting cases are, it must be 
remembered, popular with the voting public. In haste, it seems the 
Government’s prime concern was to prevent the collapse of ongoing cases 
involving anonymous testimony, even if this meant sacrificing the concerns 
for the rights of the accused which their Lordships in Davis had highlighted.  
Yet the legislation that emerged on the statute books on July 21st 2008 
seems to acknowledge the concerns for the right to a fair trial that their 
Lordships had raised. The Witness Anonymity Act cannot be viewed as a 
wholesale departure from the European Convention, or even as a reversal of 
their Lordships’ decision in Davis. Intriguingly, it is almost certain that Davis 
would have been decided the same way under the principles of the new 
33 Liberty, at para [18] of their Briefing on the Criminal Evidence (Witness 
Anonymity) Bill 2008 concluded that “the history of rushed legislation is not a good 
one” drawing attention in particular to the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 and Part 4 of the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.  
34 I Kelcey “Panic and Rough Justice” Law Society Gazette July 17th 2008.  
35 “Explanatory Notes” July 3rd 2008 para [50]. 
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legislation.36 Indeed, it is clear that the Government has strived to incorporate 
into the Witness Anonymity Act measures and the safeguards to ensure 
compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights reached the same 
determination as the Bill passed through Parliament.37  
As was noted above section 1(2) of the Witness Anonymity Act abolished 
the common law rules “relating to the power of a court to make an order for 
securing the identity of a witness in criminal proceedings is withheld from a 
defendant.”38 The 2008 Act is thus now the sole authority under which a 
criminal court may grant a witness special measures to conceal identity. 
Section 3(2) of the 2008 Act details the measures a criminal court may grant a 
witness in order to achieve this aim; witnesses remain able to give evidence 
under pseudonyms, behind screens and with their voices electronically 
modulated or distorted.39 Section 2(2(a) of the Act allows prosecutors to 
withhold the identity of anonymous witnesses from the defence, by way of 
excluding any potentially-identifying detail from normal prosecution 
disclosure. This provision of the 2008 Act, although necessary to achieve the 
stated aim of concealing identities fully, constitutes one of the principal 
challenges to the right of the accused to challenge his accusers. Scrutiny of 
Crown witnesses, on the critical issues of motive and credibility, is largely left 
to prosecutors, a difficulty discussed at greater length below.  
Further detrimental to the common law right of confrontation is section 
3(2)(c), which proscribes “questions of any specified description that might 
lead to the identification of the witness.” This provision puts a clear bar on 
potentially probative lines of cross-examination, which may often be vital to 
the conduct of a defendant’s case. Under the 2008 Act, then, an anonymous 
witness, scrutinised solely by the Crown, may avoid difficult questions from 
defence counsel with impunity.  
Section 3 of the Witness Anonymity Act deals with the manner in which 
applications for anonymity orders must be sought. Even in this initial 
procedure there appears to exist an inherent (although it is submitted not a 
serious) inequality between prosecution and defence applications. Section 
3(2) allows the Court to rule that the prosecution may conceal the identity of a 
36 A conclusion widely expressed among commentors following the passage of the 
2008 Act: See Liberty Briefing on the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Bill 
2008 para [14].  
37 JCHR: Legislative Scrutiny: Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Bill. Twenty-
Sixth report of session 2007 – 2008. July 15th 2008.  
38 Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008, s 1(2). 
39 Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008, s 3(2)(b) allows for 
pseudonyms, 3(2)(d) allows for screening and s (3)(2)(e) for voice modulation “to any 
specified extent.”  
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potential anonymous witness from not only the defence, but even from the 
Court. In cases where there is a sole defendant, however, section 3(3) forces 
the defence to disclose the identity of any potential anonymous witnesses for 
the defence to the prosecution. In a case where a defendant alleges police 
misconduct or intimidation this inequality, allowing the prosecution to know 
the identity of all apparently anonymous defence witnesses, may cause such a 
defendant, or any potentially-key defence witnesses, some difficulty.40  
Criminal courts may only make a witness anonymity order if the three 
“Conditions” set out section 4 of the 2008 Act are satisfied. Condition A 
provides that an anonymity order must be “necessary” to protect the safety of 
a witness or other person, or to prevent serious damage to property. 
Alternatively, Condition A can be satisfied if an order is “necessary…in order 
to prevent any real harm to the public interest.”41 Condition B states that any 
anonymity order must be “consistent with” the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial.42 Finally, Condition C provides that an anonymity order must be 
“necessary…in the interests of justice.”43 An order is necessary in the 
interests of justice under section 4(5) of the Act if (a) it is important that the 
witness should testify and (b) the witness would not testify if the order were 
not made.  
Significantly, section 5 of the Act states that a court must have regards to 
five “relevant considerations”, listed at section 5(2), before granting a witness 
anonymity order in criminal proceedings.44 These “considerations” appear to 
deliberately address concerns which their Lordships expressed in Davis: (a) 
the general right of a defendant to know the identity of witnesses, (b) the 
extent to which credibility of a witness is likely to be in issue, (c) whether 
evidence given by an anonymous witness is likely to be the “sole or decisive” 
factor in a finding of guilt, (d) whether the defendant is believed to have a 
tendency to be dishonest or a motive to give false testimony and (e) whether 
any other method of protecting the witness’s identity would be practicable or 
more appropriate at trial.  
Furthermore, s 7 of the Act provides that a direction must be given to the 
jury at the close of a trial where anonymous evidence has been given to ensure 
the defendant is not prejudiced in the minds of jurors. Such a measure is a 
bare minimum requirement; anecdotal evidence reveals the extent to which 
jurors are influenced by non-evidentiary matters at trial. It is particularly easy 
to foresee a jury determining, even subconsciously, that a defendant must be a 
dangerous individual if they are capable of instilling such fear in a witness so 
40 Above n 15, pp 6-9. 
41 Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008, s 4(3).  
42 Ibid, s 4(4).  
43 Ibid, s 4(5). 
44 Ibid, s 5(2).  
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as the Court deems their identity must be concealed for their safety.45 Surely a 
jury will then determine, albeit subconsciously, that such a “dangerous 
individual” must be removed from society for the protection of the general 
public, whether they happen to be guilty of the particular offence(s) charged 
or not. The mandatory jury direction will, to some degree, alleviate this risk of 
unfairness in the criminal trial; yet mitigating the risk of unfairness in a 
criminal trial is surely insufficient. The right to a fair trial, under Art 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, is an absolute one. The question of 
whether a jury direction is sufficient to ensure a fair trial for the accused is 
just one of many such concerns which may reasonably be advanced by those 
concerned with the future of a fair and just criminal process in England and 
Wales.   
As was noted above, s 5(2) seeks to act as a “safety valve” to ensure 
judges consider the critical human rights issues that arise from the use of 
anonymous witnesses before granting any order to permit their use at trial. 
Yet it is questionable whether the matters listed in this provision should be 
presented to trial judges with merely the status of “relevant considerations.” 
Some of the considerations, such as the general right of confrontation of one’s 
accusers and the “sole and decisive evidence” test have a status of their own 
in common law and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights.46 It can be argued that a judge in determining a witness anonymity 
application should more than merely consider the factors in s 5(2); for the Act 
to be truly compatible with human rights the judge should be satisfied to a 
very high standard that a fair trial would follow from the use of any 
anonymous witness evidence.   
If the concerns of their Lordships are taken as largely reflected and 
nullified through the “relevant considerations” there is one critical concern, 
raised by Lord Bingham in Davis, which the Act fails to account for. Lord 
Bingham states that: “the fairness of a trial should not largely depend on the 
diligent performance of their duties by the prosecuting authorities”, yet the 
Act strives to achieve scrutiny of potential witnesses solely through the 
disclosure obligations of the Crown.47 Section 5(2)(c) of the Act requires the 
presiding judge to consider the credibility of a potential candidate for witness 
anonymity in terms of any tendency to be untruthful and any motive they may 
have to give false testimony against the particular defendant to face trial. Yet 
45 Liberty Briefing on the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Bill 2008, para 
[16]. 
46 Above n 10, at para [3(k)] in which it was stated “even when the counterbalancing 
procedures did compensate sufficiently for the handicaps under which the defence 
laboured, a conviction should not be based to a decisive extent on anonymous 
statements.” 
47 Lord Bingham in Davis at para [31].  
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
79 
                                                     
all the documentation provided to the court for the undertaking of this 
consideration is provided by the prosecution. Injustice will occur following 
such a course. The Attorney General’s Guidelines which followed the 2008 
Act state that “the role of the prosecutor as an independent and impartial 
minister of justice is of paramount importance”,48 yet this assurance 
represents little by the way of safeguard for a defendant. One ambitious 
prosecutor, keen to obtain a high profile conviction, or one negligent police 
officer would be all it would take for the fairness of the scrutiny regime, as 
presently enacted, to evaporate, taking the fairness of the trial with it. The 
sponsors of the 2008 Act would dispute the suggestion that any professional 
associated with the prosecuting authorities would act with anything other than 
“scrupulous fairness.”49 However, history suggests that there is at least a risk 
of prosecutors failing to disclose everything which they reasonably could to 
the defence. The trial of Kieron Fallon for alleged “race fixing” collapsed 
recently when prosecutors failed to disclose expert reports, which undermined 
to their case against the jockey.50
The issue of inadequate scrutiny of prosecution witnesses exposes the 
biggest shortcoming of the Witness Anonymity Act. The present inadequacy 
of the scrutiny regime lends itself to one inevitable solution, which the Act 
neglects to provide for; the use of independent counsel to test the proposed 
prosecution evidence for credibility, veracity and admissibility within the 
parameters of human rights law. The New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 
provides for an express statutory discretion for a trial judge to appoint of 
independent counsel when the court is faced with an application for a witness 
anonymity order. The full implications and benefits of such an approach are 
examined in the final section of this article.  
The present regime in England and Wales, by way of contrast, does more 
than omit to provide for such a safeguard and assurance of adequate scrutiny. 
Sources tangential to the Act go so far as to dismiss such an approach to 
witness anonymity applications. The Attorney General’s Guidelines on 
witness anonymity procedure note that the Attorney General does have the 
power to appoint such special counsel, despite no mention being made of such 
a procedure in the Act.51 However, the Guidelines fall back on the ratio of the 
House of Lords case of R v H & C,52 and deem the appointment of 
48 Attorney General’s Guidelines: The Prosecutor’s Role in Applications for Witness 
Anonymity Orders. Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity Act) 2008 para [B4]. 
49 Ibid, para [B3]. 
50 Kieron Fallon trial – R v Lynch & Others (2007) unreported. The Times reported the 
collapse of the “race fixing trial” at the Central Criminal Court on December 8th 2007: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/racing/article3019158.ece.  
51 Above n 49, para [D2].  
52 R v H, R v C [2004] 2 AC 134.  
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independent counsel “exceptional, never automatic” and “a course of last and 
never first resort.”53 The role of the court in assessing the evidence, coupled 
with the prosecutor’s duty to put all relevant material before the court, should 
be sufficient for “a fair and informed decision to be reached without the need 
for Special Counsel.”54
Yet the present scrutiny regime for witness anonymity orders remains the 
most significant threat to the fair trial that arises out of the Witness 
Anonymity Act 2008. The Act expects the prosecutor to firstly have the 
ability to look at his evidence with eyes of the defendant and secondly, to be 
able to perform this task as well and as diligently as a defence team, with full 
instructions from the accused. Though co-operation between defence and 
prosecution is increasingly deemed desirable in our criminal justice system 
the principles of adversary cannot be compromised when it comes to the 
scrutiny of evidence and the just advancement of the defence case.  
The final section of this article will seek to determine how this 
unsatisfactory situation can be remedied, and to highlight various other 
models for witness protection that Parliament should at the very least debate 
before proceeding to replace the present Witness Anonymity Act.  
 
AFTER SUNSET: WHAT NEXT FOR WITNESS PROTECTION 
AND THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED? 
 
The Coroners and Justice Bill, introduced into Parliament on 14th January 
2009, proposes re-enact the 2008 Law Reform (Witness Anonymity) Act 
2008, which was originally due to expire on December 31st 2009.55 Insofar as 
they constitute a modification of the measures enacted in July 2008 the 
proposals in Part 3 of the Coroners Bill for the future treatment of the 
evidence of anonymous witnesses will be examined below. Consideration will 
also be given to the Court of Appeal judgment, from December 2008, in R v 
Mayers, the case that represented the appellate court’s first opportunity to 
interpret and apply the provisions of the 2008 Witness Anonymity Act.56  
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW PART 1: R V MAYERS 
 
The consolidated appeals of Mayers represent the first reported appeals 
against conviction emerging in the wake of the Law Reform Witness 
Anonymity Act 2008. S11 of the 2008 Act provides that an appeal against 
53 Attorney General’s Guidelines: The Prosecutor’s Role in Applications for Witness 
Anonymity Orders. Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity Act) 2008 para [D2].  
54 Ibid, para [D2]. 
55 See Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008, s 14.  
56 R v Mayers [2008] EWCA Crim 2989.  
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conviction may be deemed unsafe if a witness anonymity order was made at 
trial before commencement of the Act  (July 21st 2008) and such an order 
could not have been made had the Act been in force at the material time.57 
Additionally, such a pre-commencement order must have meant the defendant 
“did not receive a fair trial” for an appeal against conviction to succeed.58
In the case of Jordan Mayers, a “pre-commencement” case, an appeal 
against conviction was allowed by the Court of Appeal, and the appellant’s 
conviction for murder was quashed. At his trial, due to start on July 9th 2007, 
the Crown relied on the evidence of an anonymous witness “Jeanette Evans”, 
who purported to identify Mayers as the assailant in a fatal knife attack. 
However, the existence of this witness was only made known to the defence 
on 28th June 2008, leaving the time frame for scrutiny of “Jeanette Evans” in 
terms of credibility and potential motive for testifying short.  
Allowing the appeal of Mayers the Court of Appeal concluded as follows:  
 
“Notwithstanding the absence of full and comprehensive inquiries 
needed to set against the disadvantages created for the appellant by the 
anonymity order, [Jeanette Evans’s] evidence assumed decisive 
importance in the case against the appellant. Without it a conviction 
would have been highly improbable.”59
 
The appeal thus succeeded because the trial anonymity order would now 
be incompatible with the Witness Anonymity Act in two important regards. 
Firstly, the Court of Appeal deemed the evidence of “Jeanette Evans” 
“decisive”. As was noted above the “sole or decisive evidence” test is 
incorporated into the 2008 Act as a “relevant consideration” which the trial 
judge must take into account in determining whether the defendant may 
receive a fair trial.60 Secondly, the Court of Appeal found that the prosecution 
before the trial of Mayers did not adequately test the credibility and character 
of “Jeanette Evans”. Such a lack of investigation would now make satisfaction 
of sections 5(2)(d) and (e) of the Act, concerning consideration of whether a 
witness may have any “tendency or motive” to be dishonesty, difficult.  
The Court of Appeal has set the requisite standard of investigation into the 
credibility and motive of potentially anonymous witnesses at a high level. 
Lord Judge stated in Mayers that should a trial judge “entertain reservations” 
about the diligence of prosecution scrutiny then an application for witness 
anonymity under the 2008 Act should be “met with a point blank refusal.”61  
57 Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008, s 11(2)(b)(i).  
58 Ibid, s 11(2)(b)(ii).  
59 Above n 56, at para [52].  
60 Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008, s 5(2)(c). 
61 Above n 56, at para [10].  
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The appeal of Junior Glasgow, heard alongside that of Mayers, was 
refused, however, thus establishing a contrast with the successful appeal of 
Mayers, illustrative of the dividing line between a safe and unsafe conviction 
where a witness anonymity application had been granted at trial. The appeal 
of Glasgow, against conviction for murder, was refused on the basis that 
firstly, sufficient consideration had been given to the credibility of 
anonymous trial witnesses and secondly, that the trial judge had considered 
possible alternatives to making an anonymity order. In contrast to the situation 
in Mayers, the anonymous witnesses in Glasgow had been identified at an 
early stage and were thus adequately vetted to ensure independence of one 
another and lack of motive for testifying against the accused. The judge at the 
trial of Glasgow was credited by the Court of Appeal as having “anticipated 
and addresses the pre-conditions to making a witness anonymity order” and, 
as such, ensured the defendant had received a fair trial.62  
The final two appeals in Mayers are further usefully illustrative of the 
application of the 2008 statutory regime. The third appeal, that of Costelloe & 
Bahmanzadeh, concerned the admissibility of anonymous testimony at trial 
from undercover police officers. The evidence of the undercover officers was 
deemed not to have been the “sole or decisive” evidence against the two 
appellants, even when “taken cumulatively.”63 There was no suggestion that 
the officers had any tendency or motive to be dishonest. For these reasons the 
appeal was dismissed.  
The final appeal in Mayers and others, of V, P &R, was not an appeal 
against conviction but “an interlocutory appeal by the prosecution against a 
decision on September 19th 2008 that the Act did not permit a witness 
anonymity order to be made unless it was proposed that the witness or 
witnesses would be called to give evidence.”64 The Court of Appeal 
considered whether an anonymity order may be made in respect of an absent 
witness and, in the alternative, whether it was possible to admit anonymous 
hearsay evidence. Both questions were answered in the negative, the Court of 
Appeal declining to re-write the Witness Anonymity Act 2008 or to expand 
the hearsay provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.65  
The appeal of Mayers has usefully elucidated the terms of the 2008 
Witness Anonymity Act, illustrating through the contrasting cases of Mayers 
and Glasgow when a trial will be deemed unfair owing to inadequate scrutiny 
of potential anonymous witnesses. An example of evidence falling short of 
being “sole or decisive” is provided in the appeal of Costelloe & 
62 Ibid, at para [76].  
63 Ibid, at para [87].  
64 Ibid, at para [2].  
65 Ibid, at para [113]. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
83 
                                                     
Bahmanzadeh and anonymous hearsay is expressly excluded from being 
within the scope of the 2008 Act in the interlocutory appeal of V, P & R.  
Further appeals in this sphere will doubtless be heard and reported in the 
coming months. It is submitted that the Court of Appeal’s willingness to 
quash the conviction of Mayers represents a strong indication that for a 
witness anonymity application to be granted in the future, trial judges will 
expect prosecutors to show a significantly heightened degree scrutiny and 
disclosure relating to such witnesses. Such an enhanced expectation will serve 
to go some way allay the fears of defence lawyers that where a witness’ 
identity is concealed significant lines of investigation and cross examination, 
crucial to the conduct of the defence are lost. 
 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW PART 2: THE CORONERS 
AND JUSTICE BILL 2009 
 
On January 14th 2009 the Government introduced the Coroners and Justice 
Bill, Part 3, Chapter 2 of which is intended to replace the Witness Anonymity 
Act, due to expire on December 31st 2009. At the time of writing the Bill has 
passed a second reading in the House of Commons (on January 26th 2009), 
with proposals concerning coroners and inquests attracting more attention 
through the committee stage and in the media than the provisions relating to 
the criminal law of evidence. The Bill is due to remain in the Commons 
committee stage until March 10th.  
Sections 1–9 and 14 of the Witness Anonymity Act 2008 would be 
repealed by the Coroners and Justice Bill, though their content is largely re-
enacted by the provisions, near identical in wording and structure, contained 
in Chapter 2, Part 3 of the Bill.66 Principle among the modifications the Bill 
seeks to make to the 2008 Statute is the proposed modification of “Condition 
C”, at section 4(5) of the 2008 Act, to remove the word “necessary.”67 As 
such, a witness anonymity order would no longer need to be “necessary… in 
the interests of justice” before being granted. Instead, “Condition C” now 
merely requires “that the importance of the witness’s testimony is such that in 
the interests of justice the witness ought to testify.”68 The hurdle imposed by 
“Condition C” appears to be lowered by the proposed legislation. Whether 
this new phraseology will make a significant difference to trial judges’ 
considerations in deliberating an anonymity order remains to be seen.  
Clause 74 of the Coroners and Justice Bill seeks to expand the measures 
contained in the 2008 legislation on discharge or variation of witness 
66 Clause 79 of the Coroners and Justice Bill states: “Sections 1 to 9 and 14 of the 
Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 (c. 15) cease to have effect.” 
67 Coroners and Justice Bill 2009 clause 71(5). 
68 Ibid.  
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anonymity orders. The new Bill inserts, by way of clause 74(3) a requirement 
for trial judges to give “every party to the proceedings the opportunity to be 
heard” before discharge or variation of an order. Clause 74(4), however, 
allows a prosecution application to be heard in the absence of the defendant 
and his representatives. The Bill does not provide for a right of appeal against 
the making, or indeed the refusal of, an anonymity order. As the Explanatory 
Notes state: “The Government considers that existing appeal procedures are 
sufficient….In the case of a defendant, the matter may be raised on appeal 
against conviction.”69 It may be debated whether some form of “fast track” 
appeal procedure, avoiding significant delay to the trial process, could have 
been implemented. Taking the case of Davis as a relevant example, an appeal 
against conviction can take a matter of years to be heard.  
The human rights organisation Liberty draws the most fitting conclusion 
on the provisions of the Coroners and Justice Bill relating to criminal 
evidence and witness anonymity orders: “While we believe that the provisions 
in this Bill could be improved on we do not take specific issue with this 
Chapter.”70 The Bill does not seek to introduce measures which are an added 
handicap or detriment to the accused, yet neither does seek to make positive 
advances in the opposite direction. The enhancement of the absolute right of 
the accused to an absolutely fair trial is not the primary purpose, nor 
incidental effect of the Bill. This article will now draw to a conclusion by 
examining how the provisions of the Coroners and Justice Bill 2009 could 
have established a more satisfactory, long-term solution to the related 
problems of witness intimidation and the difficulties which arise from the use 
of anonymous witnesses in our criminal courts.  
 
MOVING TO A LONG-TERM SOLUTION: 
 
Despite the Government’s pledge to revisit the issue of witness anonymity 
in the present Parliament, as asserted above the Coroners and Justice Bill 
represents an opportunity missed. As opposed to a piece of legislation 
specifically designed to address the problem of witness intimidation, whilst 
giving renewed regard to the rights of the accused, the government seeks to 
re-enact measures drafted in haste in July 2008, intended then only as an 
interim solution.  
It is submitted that there are three viable proposals for the future of 
witness protection in England and Wales, which may sufficiently safeguard 
the rights of the accused and preserve the right to a fair trial into the future. 
Each of these will now be assessed. 
69 Coroners and Justice Bill Explanatory Notes, issued January 14th 2009, para [436]. 
70 Liberty’s Second Reading Briefing on the Coroners and Justice Bill in the House of 
Commons para [47].  
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(a) The Independent Counsel / New Zealand Model 
 
In similar fashion to England and Wales, New Zealand passed witness 
anonymity laws following decisions in the appellate courts which affirmed the 
defendant’s absolute right to confront his accusers.71 The resulting New 
Zealand Evidence Act 2006 sought to allow for anonymous testimony in 
criminal courts in certain, limited circumstances. The provisions of the New 
Zealand Act are markedly different in two critical regards to the provisions 
presently enacted in England and Wales. It is submitted that both of these 
differences in approach taken by the New Zealand statute should form part of 
any future domestic legislation on the use of anonymous witnesses. 
The first difference of approach taken in the New Zealand Evidence Act 
concerns how widely witness anonymity orders should be granted. Section 
110 (1) of the New Zealand Act states that such an order may only be granted 
where “a person is charged with an offence and is to be proceeded against by 
indictment.”72 Although the case of R v Davis may lead domestic observers 
towards the conclusion that anonymity orders are to be the sole preserve of 
cases concerning only serious, indictable-only offences such as murder, there 
is nothing in the 2008 legislation which restricts the granting of an anonymity 
order to certain categories of serious offences. The considerations to be taken 
into account by a New Zealand judge before granting an anonymity order are 
listed in section 110 (5) of the 2006 Act. The third of six considerations listed 
is “the gravity of the offence.”73 Again, it is clear that the New Zealand 
legislation seeks to limit the use of anonymous testimony to the most serious 
indictable offences.  
This is a step that any future legislation must take, so as to avoid the 
widespread handicapping of defendants throughout the criminal justice 
system. As soon as the prosecuting authorities are able to offer potential 
witnesses anonymity when proceeding with a wide range of offences such 
witnesses may begin to form the view that anonymity is their entitlement, and 
only acquiesce to give evidence on the condition that they remain anonymous. 
The Attorney General in his Guidelines on anonymity orders acknowledges 
that seeking such an order is a “serious step”,74 but if such testimony is to be 
allowed in the courts of England and Wales it must firmly remain an 
exception, as opposed to moving towards the status of a rule.  
The second difference of approach which makes the New Zealand model 
a better safeguard of the rights of the accused is the provisions relating to 
71 See R v Hughes [1986] 2 NZLR 129 and R v Hines (unreported) Court of Appeal 
August 15th 1997, CA 465/96.  
72 New Zealand Evidence Act 2006, s 110(1).  
73 New Zealand Evidence Act 2006, s 110(5)(c). 
74 Above n 48, para [D1].  
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“independent counsel.” As was noted above, the present arrangement under 
the 2008 legislation, where the defendant is dependent on the diligence of 
prosecution disclosure to test the credibility of witnessed against him, is 
roundly unsatisfactory. Such an approach was, it must be remembered, pre-
emptively condemned by Lord Bingham in Davis.75
The Law Commission of New Zealand noted in their report on proposed 
witness anonymity laws that: 
 
“Since an anonymity order necessarily deprives the accused and 
defence counsel of the normal right to knowledge of the witness’s 
identity, we propose that independent counsel be appointed by the 
court at public expense, to conduct enquiry into the witnesses 
truthfulness and reliability and the evidence that the witness will give 
in the proceedings. The purpose of such an appointment will be to 
compensate as far as practicable for the disadvantage to the defence 
occasioned by the order.”76
 
Such a recommendation became law in the form of section 115 of the 
New Zealand Act.  
Section 115(1)(a) gives independent counsel, appointed at the discretion 
of the presiding judge, a broad remit to objectively assess both the likely 
truthfulness of any testimony, which it is proposed should be given 
anonymously, as well as the need for an anonymity order in the first place. 
Section 115(2) further provides that the independent counsel must be provided 
with “all the information relating to proceedings” so as a full assessment of 
the need for, and possible flaws of, potentially anonymous testimony can be 
vetted and exposed to the trial judge.  
The benefits of such independent counsel are readily determinable by 
reference to the flaws, discussed above, in the present system in England and 
Wales of reliance on prosecution disclosure for the maintenance of the fair 
trial. Although the present domestic framework does not expressly rule out the 
appointment of independent counsel guidance which has followed the 2008 
Act has almost impliedly done so.77 Any future legislation which is founded 
on the premise that anonymous testimony is desirable must expressly provide 
for independent counsel to conduct the analysis of both the need for and 
potential flaws of proposed anonymous testimony in any given criminal trial. 
Further to this the New Zealand model must be followed in terms of expressly 
limiting the use of anonymous testimony to the Crown Court, and to the few 
75 Above n 8, at para [31]. 
76 Law Commission of New Zealand: Evidence Law: Witness Anonymity-.A 
Discussion Paper (NZLC PP29, 1997) para [71].   
77 See above for discussion of AG Guidelines.  
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most serious indictable-only offences. Such measures would serve to restore 
the rights of the accused to prominence in the criminal justice process in 
contract to the provisions of the 2008 Act, which merely see that such rights 
are taken into account and balanced against other considerations.  
 
(b) The “Enhanced Disclosure” Model 
 
Should the government seek to develop rather than overhaul the 2008 
Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act it is possible that the disclosure 
obligations of the prosecution may be enhanced, to provide a greater degree of 
scrutiny of proposed witnesses against the accused. Philip Katz QC first 
mooted such a proposal, requiring prosecutors not only to fulfil their existing 
obligations of disclosure under the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act 
1996, but to also undertake an active search for material which may 
undermine witness credibility or the need for anonymous witness order.78The 
attraction of such a proposition from the government’s perspective is clear; a 
complete overhaul of the 2008 Act would be unnecessary. The Government 
could reinforce its human rights credentials by claiming to augment the rights 
of the accused through enhancing the burden of disclosure on the prosecution, 
indeed creating a burden of active investigation. 
The Court of Appeal in R v Mayers recently made some encouraging 
remarks about the degree of diligence which will be expected of prosecutors 
when seeking an anonymity order. The Lord Chief Justice stated in Mayers:  
 
“Our approach to this issue enables us to highlight that the obligations 
of the prosecution in the context of a witness anonymity application 
go much further than the ordinary duties of disclosure. As we shall see 
when we examine the statutory considerations a detailed investigation 
into the background of each potential anonymous witness will almost 
inevitably be required.”79
 
It was on the basis of inadequate scrutiny of the witness “Jeanette Evans” 
that the appeal of Jordan Mayers was allowed. The Court of Appeal also 
restated the importance of the defence statement, though, which “must help 
inform and focus the disclosure process”80, particularly in light of the 
78 Philip Katz QC interviewed on the BBC Radio 4 programme “Law in Action” June 
24th 2008.  
79 Above note 56, at para [10].  
80 Ibid, para [12].  
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enhanced content requirements for such statements, in force from November 
3rd 2008.81
Yet the fact remains that for a fair trial to take place the defence must be 
the party which scrutinised the proposed evidence. A defendant cannot be 
expected to rely on prosecutors to provide his defence for him. If it is 
accepted that extra scrutiny must be made mandatory before witness 
anonymity can be granted then independent counsel may as well perform the 
extra work this would entail, charged to act with objectivity and the fairness 
of proceedings at the forefront of their mind, as opposed to securing a 
conviction. Again it bears repeating: a prosecutor cannot assess the credibility 
of a witness in the same way as a defendant, who may know or recognise the 
potential witness, or consider them an enemy, can. If the defence in cross-
examination cannot test evidence the defence prior to admission at trial must 
test it. Failing even this, independent counsel must perform the test if the bear 
minimum of fairness in the criminal trial is to be upheld. 
 
(c) The “Witness Protection”/International Model 
 
Prior to drawing conclusions as to the future of this contentious area of the 
criminal law it is worth considering whether our courts should allow, or 
indeed whether we have a genuine present need for, anonymous testimony in 
criminal courts.  
The media frenzy, which followed the law lord’s decision in Davis, 
demonstrates the popular sentiment that dangerous criminals should be 
convicted by whatever means possible.82 The government argue, and will 
continue to argue, that the law must exist to protect the innocent. It can be 
shown that witness intimidation is rife in England and Wales, with 
convictions for such having doubled in number between 1996 and 2005.83
However, even if it is accepted that witness intimidation is a real and 
severe threat to the administration of criminal justice in England and Wales it 
is still arguable whether interference with the trial process, and 
consequentially the fairness of the trial and the rights of the accused, is the 
most effective manner in which to address this problem.  
It must be noted that the number of countries with judicial systems that 
have due regard to human rights, which also allow the use of anonymous 
testimony in criminal courts is small in number. The United States has 
81 S 60(1) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (in force 3/11/08) adds a 
new s 6A (1) (ca) to the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act 1996 which 
requires that a defendant’s Defence Statement must set out “particulars of the matters 
of fact on which he intends to rely for the purposes of his defence.” 
82 Above n 8 and 9, with regard to the outrage expressed in the media post Davis.  
83 Lord Carswell raises this statistic in his judgement in Davis at para [52].  
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enshrined the right of the accused to fully test the evidence against him in 
their Constitution, the Sixth Amendment stating that “the accused shall enjoy 
the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”84 Pursuant to 
this, the US Supreme Court has vigorously struck down attempts in the lower 
courts to make inroads into this constitutional right. In Alford v United 
States85 the Supreme Court made a now often-quoted statement: 
 
“The witnesses name and address open countless avenues of in-court 
examination and out-of-court investigation. To forbid this most 
rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the 
right of cross examination itself.”86
 
The principle upon which this statement is founded is timeless. A 
defendant must have the right to defend himself, by testing the evidence 
against him, a right also encapsulated in Article 6 (3) (d) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights87. Such a fundamental right can not be 
“balanced” with any other considerations, even the deemed “public interest” 
in protecting witnesses from fear. It can not be in the long term public interest 
to downgrade the right to a fair trial. 
It is not only the United States which rejects the notion of witness 
anonymity. The South African courts have resisted attempts to encroach upon 
the right of confrontation, most notably in the leading case from 1986 of S v 
Leepile.88 Such was the force of this case that there have been no further cases 
on witness anonymity in South Africa since. In addition to the United States 
and South Africa the forty-seven Council of Europe countries also reject the 
need for anonymous testimony as a weapon against witness intimidation.  
The government would certainly have a more difficult task of persuading 
the public that witness anonymity is necessary here if it were made clear just 
how isolated the 2008 Act makes our position in a global context. It cannot be 
convincingly argued that serious gang crime and witness intimidation is worse 
in London or Birmingham than it is in New York, Italy or on the streets of 
Johannesburg or Bloemfontein. 
84 “The Constitution of the United States” Amendment 6. (Ratified 1791). 
85 Alford v United States 282 US 687 (1931). 
86 Ibid.  
87 “The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” Art 6 
(3)(d). 
88 S v Leepile:(5)1986(4)SA187(W). In this case Ackermann J refused an application 
by the prosecutor to allow the true identity of a witness to be withheld,  ruling that 
such must be disclosed to the defence. Of particular interest was Ackermann J’s 
finding that granting anonymity to a witness might “heighten the witness’s sense of 
impregnability and increase the temptation to falsify or exaggerate” at para [189].  
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As opposed to interfering with the trial process, and as a consequence the 
rights of the accused, the weapon many of the above mentioned states employ 
to combat the menace of witness intimidation is large-scale, well funded 
witness protection programmes. The goal of ensuring potential witnesses are 
not too fearful to testify in criminal courts is achieved by providing them with 
the option of a new identity and new home, hidden far from any danger of 
reprisal following their testimony. Evidence from other states attests to the 
effectiveness of witness protection: the United States Marshal Service boast of 
never having lost a witness placed in their care post-trial.89 If such witness 
protection can be achieved in the United States, without damage to the 
fairness of the trial process, why has such a measure not been considered in 
England and Wales? 
The Lord Chief Justice Sir Igor Judge has cast doubt, firstly in the Court 
of Appeal hearing of Davis and, more recently, in the appeal of Mayers, on 
the value of expanding witness protection in England and Wales. His 
Lordship, in his judgment in Mayers found that there was a “degree of 
unreality about the submission that witness relocation should normally 
provide a practicable alternative to an anonymity order.”90 In Davis in 2006 
Lord Judge deemed witness protection as “grossly invasive of the right of the 
witness and his family to private and family life.” Yet it is submitted that the 
rights of the witness which the Lord Chief Justice describes are naturally 
accompanied by social responsibilities. One such responsibility, that every 
citizen must bear, is to aid the process of justice and, it follows, uphold the 
rule of law against those who seek to challenge it through dangerous criminal 
activity. Whereas the government believes that they can protect the “rights of 
the innocent” through allowing witnesses anonymity it is submitted that such 
protection can not be allowed to unfairly handicap those accused of criminal 
offences, who themselves, it must remembered, are innocent too, until proven 
guilty.  
The unfortunate reality of the situation is the same as in many other 
spheres of the administration of justice in the present day: the answer is found 
in the cost. There is no doubt that a well-equipped witness protection service, 
run by a dedicated agency such as the Marshals in the United States, would 
require a substantial initial expenditure by the Ministry of Justice, and would 
add a significant weight year after year to a criminal justice budget which we 
are regularly told is over-stretched and under pressure. Yet surely it is among 
89 “No programme participant who follows security guidelines has ever been harmed 
while under the protection of the Marshalls Service” – 
(http://www.usmarshalls.gov/witsec/index.html) quoted in Justice: Criminal Evidence 
(Witness Anonymity) Bill. Briefing for the House of Commons (All Stages). July 2008 
para [14].  
90 Op cit, at para [9].  
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the first duties of any government to maintain human rights on an equal 
footing for all, particularly the right to a fair trial, whatever the cost. The 
government was forced into a volt face regarding the post 2001 policy of 
indefinitely detaining foreign terrorist suspects at Belmarsh prison following 
the House of Lords ruling in A (FC) and others v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department.91 Their Lordships deemed such a policy discriminatory 
and incompatible with human rights. Following this decision the government 
was forced to implement the more expensive policy of  “control orders” to 
achieve their policy goal. The same principle applies with witness anonymity: 
where one policy is incompatible with human rights an alternative must be 
considered, even if the cost is greater and the convenience considerably less 
so.  
 
CONCLUSION: PROTECTING WITNESSES AND 
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The Government maintains that the 2008 Witness Anonymity Act is 
“consistent with” the requirements of human rights law, and thus the debate as 
to the use of anonymous testimony is an academic one only. Yet this article 
has demonstrated the difficulty a defendant is presently placed in under the 
Act. The defendant presently faced with the prospect of anonymous testimony 
against him is dependent on prosecution disclosure for the formulation of his 
defence and subject to the undeniable prejudice he will suffer in the mind of 
jurors; in granting a witness anonymity the court has decided that the 
defendant, or his associates, pose a threat before the jury have had chance to 
consider this prosecution assertion independently.  
The Coroners and Justice Bill 2009, at the time of writing, appears to 
represent a missed opportunity for re-consideration of the 2008 Witness 
Anonymity Act and of whether depriving the defendant of a completely fair 
trial before an unequivocally impartial jury is the best way in which the 
mischief of witness intimidation may be combated. It is submitted that the 
only logical conclusion, that rightly gives due regard to the rights of the 
accused, is that it is not. Serious consideration must be given to genuine 
witness protection programme for England and Wales. Citizens who may 
become witnesses have social duties as well as human rights and the police 
and prosecution service would do well to offer this assertion before making an 
offer of trial anonymity. Through witness protection the American authorities 
have managed to dismantle large sections of the New York Mafia, without 
91 A(FC) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68. 
Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 deemed incompatible 
with the Human Rights Act 1998 as it permitted indefinite detention for foreign 
nationals but not British citizens. 
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interference with the trial process or with rights of the accused.92 Short of this 
approach, the New Zealand model, where independent counsel assesses need 
for anonymous evidence and the risk of untruthful testimony, is a bare 
minimum requirement if the right to a fair trial is to be maintained. Yet such a 
standard – the bear minimum to protect a fundamental human right – should 
not be the sum of what we aspire to. 
This article has sough to demonstrate that the debate about how best to 
protect witnesses giving testimony in criminal trials cannot be deemed over, 
even with the passage of the Coroners and Justice Bill. Witness anonymity 
need not be a fait accompli. The arguments against anonymous testimony in 
our courts must be seized again by those in Parliament who wish to see the 
right to a fair trial, and the achievement of open justice, remain fundamental 
and absolute tenets of English criminal justice not mere considerations to be 
balanced with the present deemed needs of public policy. The fact remains 
that the particular public policy the government has in mind can be achieved 
without such a challenge to justice as presently stands enacted. 
92 Clive Coleman “Can Justice Afford Witness Anonymity?” in The Times: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4192
851.ece. 
